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DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION:
AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP?
Joel Colon-Rios and Allan C. Hutchinson
“In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.”
-- Alexis de Tocqueville 1
Democracy and revolution are juxtaposed in history and its academic
commentary. As a general rule, they are considered to be unrelated and occasionally
antagonistic practices. But this is a far too sweeping and misleading a statement. While
there are some revolutions that bear little connection to democratic motives or
aspirations, there are others that are done in the service of a democratic impulse. These
‘democratic revolutions’ bear little resemblance to the coup d’états that tend to replace
one elite with another. There is a world of difference between those political
transformations that usher in a more democratic regime and those that do not. Whereas
one occurs under conditions of popular participation and support, the other does not. In
short, not all revolutionary struggles are the same in terms of their democratic legitimacy.
It is to Richard Albert’s enormous credit that he has begun to offer a more
nuanced and normative account of revolutions and their relation to democracy. 2 There
can be no doubt that he has done an enviable job at reframing the concept of revolution
so that it better captures the important distinction between good and bad revolutions in
terms of their democratic pedigree and legitimacy. Nevertheless, we maintain that Albert
has not gone far enough in his provocative analysis. While he insists that “revolution is
not the repudiation of citizenship …, [but] its affirmation” (3), we believe that he does
not go far enough in this affirmation of revolution’s intimate connection to democracy.
As such, our paper is intended to be a complementary supplement to Albert’s; it builds on
and pushes forward his approach rather than refutes or diverges from it. Whereas Albert
tends to hedge on the revolutionary dimensions of democracy, we retain and hold true to
the continuing relationship between democracy and revolutions.
We take the view that, as understood from a thoroughly democratic standpoint,
revolutions need not be “uncontainable and disorderly occurrences that resist
confinement” (14). Instead, we insist that it is better and feasible to think of certain
revolutions as being part and parcel of a vigorous democratic culture and sensibility.
Indeed, we contend that a democratic revolution can not only occur “when challengers
self-consciously adopt non-constitutional means to transform the state with the consent of
their fellow citizens” (18), but also when challengers self-consciously adopt and use
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand and Distinguished Research
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constitutional means to transform the state. For us, there is no sharp or enduring
distinction between some revolutions and constitutional changes: a robust democracy will
incorporate constitutional means by which to facilitate periodic revolutions. In this sense,
we follow through on Albert’s claim that “there can be no higher authorizing force than
citizens themselves” (4) and take even more seriously than he does “the promise of
revolution as the most noble civic ambition” (5). To paraphrase de Tocqueville, there is
no need in a true democracy to invent the end of revolution as it becomes a continuing
and integral part of democratic arrangements themselves. 3
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to explaining how
democratic revolutions can be profitably understood as exercises of constituent power
unmediated by any particular way of proceeding; reference will be made to contemporary
developments in global politics. The second part contends that the democratic legitimacy
of a revolution does not depend only on whether it was supported by citizens or on
whether the regime it creates governs in the name of the citizenry, but also on whether it
attempts re-produce its democratic impulse through a ‘weak’ constitutional order that
contains participatory procedures for its own transformation. Finally, in the third part, we
defend the radical proposal that an unconditional commitment to democracy implies that
revolutionary-initiated constitutions should leave the door open for future exercises of
constituent power or, what is the same thing, for future democratic revolutions.
Throughout, we develop and stand by an account of democracy as both a theory and
practice that re-orders the traditional relationship between constitutionalism and
democracy.
I. REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUENT POWER
For many constitutional theorists, a preferred starting-point for any analysis of
revolutions is considered to be Hans Kelsen’s work. Kelsen was interested in legal
revolutions. His focus was on changes in the constitutional regime that could not be
legally justified; these were situations in which an “order is overthrown and replaced by a
new order in a way that the former had not itself anticipated” 4. Most importantly,
Kelsen’s account of legal revolutions does not involve an inquiry into the political
morality of the historical facts and forces that brought about the founding of a new legal
system. He is not concerned with whether the revolutionaries had just cause or were
driven by a genuinely democratic impulse. On the contrary, since according to Kelsen,
norms can only derive their validity from other norms, his attention to the ultimate
origins of the legal system is only directed at explaining the ‘objective’ validity of the
revolutionary constitution. He famously explained this occurrence through the
presupposition of a non-positive basic norm. 5 Put another way, he was not interested in
examining the democratic character of the constitution-making act that brought the
3
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revolutionary constitution into existence. From the perspective of his pure theory of law,
it is simply irrelevant if a new and effective constitution was posited “by an individual
usurper or by some kind of assembly” 6.
While Kelsen’s theory allows a better understanding of the relationship between
revolutions and constitutions as well as that between lawful and unlawful constitutional
change, it is not intended to provide the tools needed to distinguish between a democratic
re-constitution or a military coup d’état. 7 Consequently, instead of looking at Kelsen’s
pure theory of law for understanding revolutions, democrats might be better advised to
consult the theory of constituent power, developed during the American and French
Revolutions. ‘Constituent power’ is the power to create new constitutions or the source of
the production of fundamental juridical norms. In its modern formulation, constituent
power is always considered to rest with the people who possess a legally unlimited
faculty to give themselves any constitution they want. In that sense, the theory of
constituent power is particularly concerned with the identity of the creator of the
constitution and with the process used for its creation. As such, it is much more palatable
and appealing to the democrat than a Kelsenian pure theory.
Although receiving its first major theoretical formulation in France, the concept of
constituent power was already present in revolutionary North America. “The people,”
wrote Thomas Young in 1777 in a letter to the citizens of Vermont, “are the supreme
constituent power and, of course, their immediate representatives are the supreme
delegate power”. 8 Similarly, but at the eve of the revolution in France, Emmanuel Sieyes
wrote that the constitution was not “the creation of the constituted power, but of the
constituent power”, and that the bearer of the constituent power was “the source and the
supreme master of positive law”. 9 In this line of thinking, a political community could
not be permanently subject to any constitution; the constituent power always remained
free to unbind itself from the established constitutional regime and create a new juridical
order. It placed democratic legitimacy ahead of theoretical purity.
6

KELSEN, supra note 3, at 116.
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This does not mean, however, that Kelsen was uninterested in democracy. See for example his “On the
Essence and Value of Democracy” in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (Arthur J. Jacobson &
Bernard Schlink, eds.) (2002).
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“Dr. Young’s Letter to the Inhabitants of Vermont, a Free and Independent State, Bounding on the River
Connecticut and Lake Champlain” (Philadelphia, April, 1977). For a contemporary discussion of the theory
of constituent power and its connections to democracy and democratic legitimacy, see Joel I. Colón-Ríos,
The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform,
48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 199 (2010).
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EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 124 and 128 (1963). Sieyes’ theory
is not an invitation to continuous revolutionary activity. In fact, it can be said that Sieyes saw that one of
the fundamental tasks of politics was that of ensuring that a situation of unbinding, an exercise of
constituent power, does not occur once a constitutional order is in place. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE
IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 63 (2003).
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But Sieyes combined his theory of constituent power with a strong commitment to
the principle of representation. He explicitly rejected more participatory forms of
democracy and even suggested that members of the ordinary legislative assembly could
transform themselves into a constituent body. He thus maintained that “the people, I
repeat, in a country which is not a democracy (and France would not be one), the people
may only speak and may only act through its representatives”. 10 Of course, Sieyes’s ideas
did not carry the day for everyone.
A prominent critic was Carl Schmitt, the controversial German jurist, who
rejected this aspect of Sieyes’ thought. Schmitt insisted that the constituent power of the
people could not be effectively represented. He stressed that constituent power could not
be reduced to any specific forms or procedures. This is why he had a critical attitude
towards the French Revolution. In particular, he disagreed with the decision of the
National Constituent Assembly of not submitting the Constitution of 1791 to popular
ratification and of adopting instead the Sieyesean view of a ‘represented’ constituent
power. “It would have been consistently democratic”, wrote Schmitt, “to let the people
itself decide, for the [constituent] will of the people cannot be represented without
democracy transforming itself into an aristocracy. Nonetheless, democracy was not at
issue in 1789. It was, rather, a constitution of a liberal, bourgeois Rechsstaat”. 11
Despite his democratic rhetoric, Schmitt was far from being a democrat himself.
However, his radicalization of the theory of constituent power provides the basis for a
more thoroughly democratic conception of revolutions. For example, building on
Schmitt, Andreas Kalyvas has argued that from the perspective of constituent power,
“phenomena such as civil disobedience, irregular and informal movements, insurgencies,
and revolutionary upheavals retain all their dignity and significance even if they directly
challenge the existing constitutional structure of power”. 12 In this conception of the
relation between democracy and constitutionalism, democracy is something much more
earthy and organic than the purist ambitions of many legal theorists. Its disruptive and
unmanageable dimensions are something to be celebrated, not lamented.

10

Quoted in Lucien Jaume, “Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its Consequences” (Paper
presented at the conference “Constituent Power and Constitutional Form”, Florence, March 2006) at 15. In
fact, Sieyes opposed democracy to the idea of representation: where representation was necessary, like in
France, there could not be a democracy: “‘No aristocracy’ ought to become a kind of rallying-cry for all the
friends of the nation and good order. The aristocrats will think that they can resort by crying: ‘No
democracy’. But we will repeat ‘No democracy’ with them and against them. These gentlemen do not
realize that representatives are not democrats; that since real democracy is impossible amongst such a large
population, it is foolish to presume it or to appear to fear it...”. Sieyes, supra note **, at 196, n.gg. As Carré
de Malberg argued, through the introduction of the principle of representation, Sieyes “notably weakened
the scope of his system of popular sovereignty”. RAYMOND CARRÉ DE MALBERG, TEORÍA
GENERAL DEL ESTADO 1165 (1948).
11
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It is not surprising, therefore, that many contemporary scholars of
constitutionalism have worked to contain the unsettling impact of constituent power in
both theory and practice. The very term ‘constituent power’ has almost entirely
disappeared from even the most ‘populist’ approaches to constitutional change. 13 When
mentioned, it is only to be discarded as an undesirable political concept. For instance, in
the sequel to We The People, Bruce Ackerman identified constituent power as an
arbitrary will that manifests itself in acts of upheaval in which “law ends, and pure
politics (or war) begins” 14. In distancing his theory of dualist democracy from the idea of
constituent power, he describes constituent power as a lawless activity; it takes place
during a political crisis in which an arbitrary will that fails to respect the constitution
triumphs over the existent constitutional regime. However, it is worth noting that, even
though Ackerman’s recommended constitutional politics do not involve the “sheer acts of
will” that allegedly characterize constituent power, his celebrated revolutionaries (e.g.,
the Founding Federalists, the Reconstruction Republicans, and the New Deal Democrats)
failed to follow the established rules for constitutional change, even if they “experienced
powerful institutional constraints on their revisionary authority.” 15
In earlier vein, Hannah Arendt shared similar concerns, maintaining that a
juridical order could never achieve sufficient stability if it was conceived as originating in
the ever-changing will of a disorganized multitude. She maintained that any structure
built on the will of the multitude as its foundation “is built on quicksand”. 16 Although
these scholars are writing in a much later era, it is likely that those types of academic
concerns drove North American and French revolutionaries to close the doors of their
revolutionary constitutions for any future exercises of constituent power. The wellknown North American debate between James Madison and Jefferson provides the
classical example.
Madison reacted against Jefferson’s insistence in periodic constituent assemblies
designed to allow the people to exercise its “right to choose for itself the form of
government it believes most promotive of its own happiness” 17. For Madison, Jefferson’s
proposal suggested to the citizenry that their current system of government was somehow
defective, depriving the government of “that veneration which time bestows on every
thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess
the requisite stability.” 18 Instead of periodic assemblies that, by opening the constitution
13

See for example Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 457 (1994) and Sanford Levinson, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW THE PEOPLE CAN
CORRECT IT) (2006).
14

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE II: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998).

15

Id.

16

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 163 (1990).
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Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 560 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1975).

18

THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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to the “decisions of the whole society” and interested “too strongly the public
passions,” 19 Madison favored a complicated amendment procedure. He favored a
process that involved a series of extraordinary majorities at the federal and state levels,
and this made even minor constitutional changes difficult to propose and unlikely to
succeed. Justice Marshall provided judicial support to this approach when he declared
that, while the people “have an original right to establish for their future government such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness”, the exercise of
this “original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently
repeated”. 20 He went on to add that, “since the authority from which they proceed can
seldom act,” these principles are “designed to be permanent”. 21
Even in France, where the theory of constituent power was originally voiced, there
was a conscious attempt to prevent constituent power’s future exercise and relevancy. In
the very last article of the French Constitution of 1791, this approach received a concise
legal formulation: “The National Assembly, having heard the reading of the above
Constitutional Act, and having approved it, declares that the Constitution is completed
and that nothing may be altered therein.” 22 Probably in a similar mood, Isaac Le
Chapelier, the French 18th century jurist and member of the National Constituent
Assembly, claimed that “the revolution was finished” because there were “no more
injustices to overcome, or prejudices to contend with” 23. Some years later, Napoleon
echoed this view and with characteristic bombast declaimed that “Citizens, the revolution
is determined by the principles that began it. The constitution was founded on the sacred
rights of property, equality, freedom. The revolution is over”. 24
19

Id.

20

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).

21

Id.

22

The French Constitution of 1791 also contained a complicated amendment provision, which is prefaced
by the following statement: “The National Constituent Assembly declares that the nation has the
imprescriptible right to change its Constitution; nevertheless, considering that it is more in conformity with
the national interest to use only the right of reforming, by the means provided in the Constitution itself,
those articles which experience has proven unsatisfactory, decrees that it shall be effected by an Assembly
of Revision in the following form.” French Constitution of 1791, Title VII “Of the Revisions of
Constitutional Decrees”. It is also telling that contemporary French constitutional theory generally sees
constituent power as susceptible of being exercised by the ordinary legislative assembly. See Denis
Baranger, “The Language of Eternity: Constitutional Review of the Amending Power in France (or the
Absence Thereof)”, ISRAEL LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2010). A similar approach is found in John
Locke’s draft constitution for the Carolinas, which stated “these fundamental constitutions…shall be and
remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government for Carolina forever”. The Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolinas,March 1, 1669 sec. 120 (The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and
Diplomacy, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc05.asp).
23

Quoted in Lucien Jaume, “Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its Consequences” (Paper
presented at the conference “Constituent Power and Constitutional Form”, Florence, March 2006) at 6.
24

Quoted in ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN
STATE 1 (1999) at 1. The declaration was issued in December 15, 1798. But these sentiments are not only
of historical interest. The very same words find an expressive echo in contemporary constitutional theory.
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These fabled exchanges set the stage for contemporary debate and still manage to
dominate it. The exercise of constituent power, of a power that threatens to replace the
existing constitutional regime, has been relegated to the terrain of the exceptional. 25 This
is hardly unexpected; the quest for constitutional stability seems to have trumped all other
ambitions. Interestingly, democracy has historically been seen as carrying with it similar
risks. For many, the prospect of the mass of ordinary people always getting what they
want and continually making and un-making fundamental laws represents the antithesis
of good government; it is considered to be the rule of persons’ ever-changing wishes
against the empire of law and reason. 26 Yet the concepts of constituent power and
democracy have a natural affinity: constituent power is not simply a power to create new
juridical orders, but to create them with those who will be subject to it. The concept of
constituent power, therefore, points toward a self-determining demos, a populace that
adopts the laws that will regulate their political association. This amounted to what Carl
Friedrich called “the right to revolution” 27 which the people could invoke and exercise at
will.
Indeed, it is this collective aspect of constituent power that connects it so
intimately and effectively with democracy; they both reinforce each other in their
commitment to the notion that there can and should be mass, direct and continuing
participation in the constitution-making process. The recent events in the Middle East
and North Africa demonstrate this phenomenon. Unorganized throngs of people have
come together to demand political freedom. This has manifested in the rallying-cry – Alsha’b yurid isquat al-nizam (‘The people want the downfall of the regime!’). 28 With
warts and all, this is an undeniable embodiment and manifestation of constituent power at
its most insistent and immediate. These popular uprisings are reminiscent of Schmitt’s
view that “the will of the people to provide for themselves a constitution can only be
As a prominent political commentator observed, “the constitution is the final act of the revolution ... by
making a constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own graves.” Ulrich Preuss,
“Constitutional Power-making for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations between
Constituent Power and the Constitution” 14 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 635, 641 (1993). Similarly, even
the fabled John Rawls took the view that the adoption of a ‘democratic constitution’ should be understood
as an expression by the people of a profound demand to govern itself in a certain way and of fixing, “once
and for all”, certain constitutional essentials. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 232 (2005).
25

For an excellent discussion of the relationship between constituent power and the exception, see Andreas
Kalyvas, ANDREAS KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY:
MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT (2008).
26

See for example JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (****) at 192-193; ADAM
FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 187 (1978).
27

CARL FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 129 (1950). See also Preuss, supra note 28, at 647, and
Kalyvas, supra note 15, at 238.

28
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made evident through the act itself and not through observation of a normatively
regulated process”. 29 As such, they represent not a step towards democracy, but a feral
exercise of the democratic instinct; they are as much a part of the democratic initiative as
more stable and less spontaneous political engagements.
The despotic regimes that have been overthrown (and those which are currently
being challenged by popular movements in the Arab world) denied citizens the traditional
liberal protections enshrined in the constitutions founded in the American and French
revolutions (and this is, of course, part of the reason why they are being overthrown).
But, at a different and deeper level, all these societies (i.e., United States, France, Libya,
Egypt, etc.) share a fundamental similarity in constitutional terms. Like the constitutions
established by the American and French revolutionaries, the juridical systems being
challenged and overthrown in the Middle East and Africa lack an opening for constituent
power to manifest itself from time to time. By prioritizing constitutionalism over
democracy and subordinating the latter to the former, these institutional arrangements
attempt to avoid future revolutions and democratic re-constitutions.
Strong
constitutionalism trumps weak democracy.
This prioritization of constitutionalism over other political values and
commitments leaves those who decide to engage in democratic revolutions in an
unfortunate position. Once they have exhausted the limited range of conventional
political avenues for change, they have to resort to the unmediated, disorganized and
occasionally violent exercise of constituent power. And it is why the French and
American revolutions are not as ‘democratic’ as Albert’s analysis suggests or many of
their defenders insist. Although to varying degrees and with varying consequences, these
upheavals suffer from and share the same democratically-debilitating tendency to stifle
and de-legitimize constituent power as those regimes in the Middle East and North
Africa. 30 Constitutionalism tends to efface, not simply channel or contain constituent
power.
II. LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
In his article, Albert suggests that to enjoy democratic legitimacy, a revolution
must have constituting and continuing legitimacy (19). That is to say, the self-conscious
29

Schmitt, supra note 13, at 131. “Self-evidently”, he added, “it can also not be judged by prior
constitutional laws or those that were valid until then”. Id. They are also reminiscent of Sheldon Wolin’s
invitation to embrace democracy’s inclinations towards revolution and re-conceive it as fugitive and
episodical in character. Democracy, says Wolin, “is a rebellious moment that may assume revolutionary,
destructive proportions, or may not.” Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy” in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 43 (Seyla Benhabib ed.)
(1996).
30

See J. COLON-RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER (forthcoming 2012) and A. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009).
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challenge and subsequent transformation of the state through non-constitutional means
must be supported by a majority of the citizenry (i.e. constituting legitimacy) and that,
once established, the new regime must govern in the name of the citizenry (i.e.
continuing legitimacy). While that approach goes a long way in helping to distinguish
between democratic revolutions and forceful seizures of state power, it does not go far
enough. That is to say, it allows us to celebrate the democratic features of the French and
American Revolutions, but not to offer a critical assessment of their democratic
shortcomings. Yet it is in those shortcomings that the key to assessing the democratic
legitimacy of a revolution, and of the constitution it inaugurates, lies. Put shortly, a
revolution, as an exercise of constituent power, should not be seen as a one-time event, or
as the extraordinary founding of a permanent juridical order that is supported by the
citizenry and that purports to govern in its name. It is both much more and much less
than that.
The Albertian conception of revolution is inconsistent with the idea of the
people’s constituent power. More pointedly, it is gravely problematic from the
perspective of democratic legitimacy. 31 Most of the revolutions that would be considered
democratic under this approach generally follow a similar pattern: a movement supported
by the people (and therefore enjoying constituting legitimacy) is successful in
transforming the state in a way that was not anticipated by the extant rules of change as
part of the established constitutional order; the new regime replaces the existing
constitution with a new one. Moreover, this new constitution would protect a set of
political and individual freedoms that would guarantee the continuing legitimacy of this
new regime. Those political and individual freedoms would normally take the form of a
bill of rights and underpin a republican form of government. So constituted, the new
regime would be showcased as being governed and legitimated with the consent of the
people. According to Albert’s interpretation, this is exactly what happened during the
American and French revolutions. 32
However, Albert’s conception of democratic legitimacy is fatally flawed. It does
not address the crucial way in which the constitution established by a successful
‘democratic revolution’ permits or facilitates the possibility of any future exercise of
constituent power. That is to say, there is no account taken of whether the new
constitution provides the citizenry with the means of engaging in the type of
constitutional overhaul that the previous regime prohibited and that made an ‘illegal’
revolution necessary in the first place. The constitutional regimes present in modern
states are in fact characterized by institutions designed to ensure that a democratic
31

It is true that Locke defended the people’s right to revolution, but the exercise of such a right was limited
to situations of extreme injustice, in which the government engaged in a “long train of abuses,
prevarications, and artifices”. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 235 (1956).
32

It is not necessary for our purposes here to challenge that interpretation. However, the contrast Albert
attempts to make between, on the one hand, the democratic character of the American and French
revolutions and, on the other, the anti-democratic character of the Russian revolution is highly contestable
(particularly when one considers that the wave of repression and dictatorship that followed the French
Revolution).
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revolution never occurs. In that respect, they share the spirit of Isaac Le Chapelier’s and
Napoleon’s dictums -- if the constitution established a just and democratic regime, why
not protect it from future revolutions? Indeed, why not hinder rather than facilitate the
reemergence of constituent power?
The problem, of course, is that no constitution can establish a permanent ‘just and
democratic regime’: the very idea of a finished constitution that seeks to prevent
instances of popular constitutional change is incompatible with democracy. Instead of
treating important constitutional transformations as occasions for establishing more just
constitutional forms and superior mechanisms for democratic engagement, most modern
constitutions attempt to regulate their own transformation through very limited and
highly technical mechanisms. They make change difficult and unlikely, even if
supported by great majorities of the population. These are amendment rules are driven by
an aspiration to consolidate the permanency of the constitutional regime, not by an urgent
impetus to maintain and preserve the revolutionary spirit that brought the constitutional
regime into existence.
For example, Article V is the amendment rule of the U.S. Constitution. While it
was created by a ‘democratic revolution’, it makes future democratic changes in the
constitution extremely difficult to effect. Indeed, it is one of the most demanding
constitutional amendment processes in the world. 33 Under Article V, two-thirds of both
Houses of Congress may propose amendments or two-thirds of the state legislatures may
apply for a Convention for proposing amendments. These proposals must then be ratified
by three-fourths of state legislatures or by three-fourths of special state conventions.
With such formidable hurdles, it is not surprising that the U.S. Constitution has been
amended only twenty-seven times in over two centuries. Moreover, it is equally telling
that the ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment took 200 years to be completed; it
was ratified in 1992, after being originally presented by James Madison in 1789. 34 All
told, Article V seems to be a less an amendment rule, but more a non-amendment rule.
Again, from a strong democratic viewpoint, Article V not only makes
constitutional change difficult and unlikely, it also makes it non-participatory;
amendment of the constitution is left in the exclusive hands of government officials,
albeit elected representatives. This is true even when the initiative to propose
constitutional changes is not only placed in Congress, but states are provided with the
initiative of applying for a (until now unprecedented) Convention which would arguably
have an unlimited power to propose amendments or even an entirely new fundamental
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law. 35 Such a Convention, at least in theory, could be seen as an attempt to reproduce the
process through which the constitution was established in the first place. Even leaving
aside the difficulties involved in calling a Convention (created in part by the supermajority rules in the initiative and ratification processes and by the possibility that
Congress might refuse to call it or to send its proposals for ratification) 36, there are certain
ambiguities in the text of Article V that make its democratic credentials questionable. For
example, would the members of the Convention be democratically elected? If they are
elected, would they be elected by the people at large or according to the principle of state
quality (e.g. one delegate for each state regardless of the size of the state’s population)?
Would the Convention have the power to adopt its own internal rules? Does the
Convention or Congress have the power of creating an alternative ratification procedure
(such as a binding national referendum)? Could Congress transform itself into a
Convention? 37
Of course, the upshot of having a next-to-impossible-to-use amendment process is
not that no changes in constitutional arrangements happen. On the contrary, it is that
change occurs by other, even less democratic means than that provided by the written
constitution itself. It is difficult to discover any society whose constitution, even if its
form remains the same, remains fixed in substance over any extended period of time.
This is especially the case in common law jurisdictions, like the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada. While jurists and politicians may pay lip-service to a nation’s
founding and enduring documents, they know that this is only the beginning of the search
for constitutional meaning. Amendment is simply one kind of change that is more
formal, less technical and often, although not always, more significant. Changes, even
of a large and significant nature, occur even though the formal process of constitutional
change itself remains unused and unchanged. While there is no simple or fixed causal
relation, the informal amendment process is inextricably linked to the formal amendment
process in that “an informal amendment process exists because formal amendment is so
difficult.” 38
In the United States, changes in constitutional law have happened at a steady and
continuous pace. While taking place under the guise of interpretation, there have been
35
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some monumental changes in the regime of constitutional structures and rights. If Brown
and Roe, for example, are treated as merely interpretive adjustments, then the supposed
distinction between interpretation and amendment becomes blurred and unreliable. 39
Constitutional history shows that there is no change that is so big that it could not be
achieved informally (and in spite of the written constitution) if the political forces are
sufficiently aligned to demand or facilitate it. It is only when there is insufficient support
for change (particularly from the elites) that the formal amendment process will appear as
a brute obstacle to change. 40 Otherwise, change will proceed with little concern for the
distinction between legal interpretation and constitutional amendment and between the
formal and informal practices of change.
Most important, by exploring how such changes have occurred, it becomes
possible to glimpse and uncover the fundamental and operative assumptions about
political power and democratic legitimacy at any point in history. In particular, the actual
institutional levers and location of such constitutional changes disclose where a society
situates the actual seat of sovereignty and where it locates the actual locus of legitimacy,
regardless of what formal constitutional provisions might suggest or recommend. As
regards the United States, this site is most definitely not the people themselves. It is the
courts, especially the Supreme Court, which have become the preferred site for effecting
important changes in the constitutional order. By design and default, they have claimed
the ultimate authority to act on behalf of the American citizenry as a self-governing and
self-constituting nation: judges have become the filters and proxies for the citizenry.
However, in a society that claims to be devoted to the ideas and practice of
democratic legitimacy, it is far from clear why the courts are the suitable or appropriate
institution to speak and act on the people’s behalf. To put it more pointedly, if the courts
are assumed to have democratic legitimacy, then democratic legitimacy is a very thin
device and counts for little in the general political scheme of things. The courts are
neither operated nor constituted in line with popular will or representative viewpoints.
Indeed, the democratic legitimacy of the courts is somewhat perversely grounded in their
willingness to act as a check on popular and direct expressions of constituent power.
This seems to put democracy firmly under the control of the constitution. At best,
democracy is reduced to merely one value in a much broader range of constitutional
commitments.
III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
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Accordingly, it is surely uncontroversial to conclude that formal amendment
processes, like Article V, and more informal practices of judial interpretation do not sit at
all well with a commitment to a strongly democratic approach to constitutional ordering.
It empowers narrow minorities (both political and judicial) with the right to veto any
proposal for change and disallows almost all forms of direct citizen participation in the
that process. Democracy is brought under the disciplinary aegis of a strong
constitutionalism and is relegated to, at best, a secondary or fringe postion in political
engagement.
However, it is not clear that a constitution’s amendment rule, no matter how
phrased or constructed, could be seen as creating a genuine opening for constituent power
to manifest itself; it prevents a democratic revolution from taking place. In fact, one of
the main features of a revolution, according to Albert’s analysis, is its nonconstitutionality: it must involve the overthrowing of the existing regime through a
violation of the established constitution. In other words, a revolution must be
accompanied or immediately followed by the coming into force of a new Grundnorm;
one of an Albertian democratic revolution’s essential characteristics is a departure from
the existing regime’s rules of change. This approach creates several theoretical and
democratic difficulties.
First, as many critics of Kelsen’s theory of revolution have pointed out, new
constitutional regimes are often born without the sort of legal rupture that the Kelsenian
approach requires. 41 For example, India achieved its independence as a result a set of
events that can be characterized as revolutionary, as Albert does (17), but experienced no
legal rupture with respect to the United Kingdom, who reluctantly passed the Indian
Independence Act in 1947. 42
Second, the requirement of non-constitutionality assumes that there is a
fundamental incompatibility between a democratic constitutional regime and
revolutionary change. Under that perspective, there cannot be such a thing as a
constitution that presents itself as open for future democratic revolutions. That is to say,
regardless of how participatory and radical the relevant constitutional change is, if it does
not takes place through a violation of the established constitutional order, it is not a
revolution. This is not only a matter of terminology, for it invites the type of approach to
constitutional change that characterizes the currently dominant conception of
constitutionalism. Constitutional change is thus seen as a special type of law-making,
one which is subject to particular procedures but that is not to be associated, or attempt to
facilitate, the exercise of constituent power. This approach sees democratic revolutions as
something that happen to undemocratic or authoritarian constitutional arrangements, but
that has no place in a properly functioning constitutional state that governs with the
41
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support and in the name of the people. Such a conception runs the risk of betraying the
very basis of a democratic revolution: a politically engaged citizenry that gives itself a
new constitution through the exercise of constituent power.
In a weakly democratic or non-democratic constitutional structure, as that present
in countries such as the United States and Libya, the exercise of constituent power would
of course be non-constitutional, as it would require a violation of the established
amendment rules (which are not characterized by creating meaningful and direct
opportunities for popular participation in constitutional change). 43 But there is no reason
why all constitutional regimes have to be like that. Instead of looking at constituent
power and revolutions as a threat to a constitution that has already achieved the desirable
degree of democracy, constitutions could approach revolutions and constituent power as
offering opportunities for correcting existing injustices through radical and participatory
constitutional transformations. It is in providing that possibility, where an important part
of the democratic legitimacy of a revolution and of the constitutional regime that it
inaugurates, lies. This conception of democratic legitimacy attempts to take what Albert
calls a revolution’s continuing legitimacy to its ultimate consequences (37). Instead of
seeing continuing legitimacy as met by a regime that governs with the consent or support
of the people, democratic legitimacy is only consistent with a constitution that sees
citizens as potential authors of a new constitutional regime and as having the capacity of
triggering a future democratic revolution.
As part of a practice of empowered democracy, there is a commitment to the
institutional challenge to construct and implement a practical set of constitutional
arrangements that approximates to what Roberto Unger has termed “a structure of nostructure”. 44 This is the effort to incorporate an element of perpetual revolution into a
constitutional set-up. The ambition is not do away with any constitution (which seems a
hopeless and unachievable ideal anyway), but to develop a constitutional tradition that
ensures that no aspect of social or legal arrangements is immune to revision and
transformation. In the attempt to diminish the distance between structure-preserving
routines and structure-transforming conflicts, “no hard-and-fast distinction separates
criticism and construction.” 45 An integral dimension of such a political program of
strong democracy would be, among other things, a genuine attempt to entitle citizens to
challenge, de-stabilize, and disrupt established institutions and practices, including and
especially the constitutional ones. This would enable the closing of both an existential
and institutional gap between ordinary and constitutional politics, between routine and
the radical engagement, and between the revolutionary and evolutionary change.
Understood in this way, a vigorous theory of ‘democratic legitimacy’ would be
obliged to take the concept and practice of constituent power seriously. As Albert writes,
43
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constituent power is “not binding on itself” (34). The problem, of course, is that the
typical liberal constitution treats constituent power as exhausted in the activity of
establishing a new constitution, as being pre-committed to a particular constitutional
form. As such, the original power of the citizenry to re-create their constitution through
extraordinary procedures in which popular involvement is as its highest and most
menaingful is nowhere to be found in the constitutions of the world’s greatest
‘revolutions’. These constitutions in fact exhibit the exactly same kind of democratic
deficit that Albert attributes to the Hobbesian conception: they proceed as if the people
relinquish its sovereignty after establishing a juridical order. Such a dominant
constitutionalist conception, even if it might symbolically appeal to ‘the people’ every
now and then, neutralizes popular sovereignty in actual political practice under the ideal
of constitutional supremacy.
In contrast to this common and limited view of the relation between democracy
and constitutionalism, the democratic potential of the theory of constituent power lies
precisely in its insistence that the people’s constitution-making power can be exercised at
any moment after a constitution is in place. This is in fact one of the major challenges
that Sieyes and Schmitt pose for the tradition of liberal constitutionalism. 46 As has been
correctly noted, for them the “pouvoir constituant remains a force to be reckoned with
well after the revolution”. 47 As showcased in the practical operations of the American
constitutional order, the constituent power has not only been tamed and neutered, but it
has been recast as an illegitimate force.
Accordingly, the democratic legitimacy of a revolution and of any ensuing
constitution is to be found as much in its openness to future exercises of constituent
power as in its pedigree and form of government it establishes. Thinking about
constituent power in this way, as being facilitated by a constitution, might appear
contrary to some of what are considerd to be its defining features, such as its unmediated
character and its irreducibility to any pre-established legal forms. But this would be
mistaken. A closer look at the theory of constituent power recommends that, while the
constituent power is to be construed as “independent of any procedures,” 48 this does not
mean that a constitution many not facilitate its exercise by making participatory
constitutional change its preeminent and central feature. It is true, of course, that
constituent power cannot be limited or regulated by any form or procedure; the bearer of
the constituent power can give life to a new constitutional order through any extra46
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constitutional mechanism (as long as the mechanisms is consistent with the very idea of
constituent power, that is to say, of a people giving itself a constitution). However, it
does not foillow that constituent power cannot be exercised through procedures that
attempt to come as close as possible to a popular constitution-making episode or, what is
the same thing, to a democratic revolution.
In fact, Schmitt considered this possibility. He maintained that, even though the
initiation of constituent power could not be regulated by any institution, the execution or
and formulation of the decisions of the constituent subject normally required certain
organization and procedure. 49 If this were not the case, the constituent subject might
remain in a state of powerlessness and disorganization; it would be unable to transform
its will into law. In the absence of mechanisms that would facilitate the ‘execution and
formulation’ of the decisions of the constituent power, the success of a popular
movement in producing important constitutional change depends on many -- sometimes
democratically irrelevant -- factors such as how effective is the state’s repressive
apparatus, how effective is a mass political movement in taking people to engage in
different forms of protest that might even involve the risk of death, how is the challenge
to the existing regime, and the regime itself, perceived by the international community,
etc. This helps to explain why in some countries (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt) the popular
movements were successful in overthrowing the existing regimes, while in other places
(e.g., Bahrain and Syria) the regimes in question have been able to survive for longer.
Moreover, even in those places in which protestors were able to initiate the
exercise of constituent power that ended in some sort of constitutional change, those
changes were not adopted through participatory processes. Not surprisingly, those
initiatives have been criticized for failing to meet some of the main demands of the
citizenry. 50 In those cases, to paraphrase Schmitt, the constituent power was not able to
transform its proposals into constitutional law. It is exactly this desire to divert the future
exercise of constituent power into a constitutional blind alley that offends the
commitment to a mode of strong democratic governance.
III. CONCLUSION
It has been the task of this comment to confirm Albert’s important insight that
“there can be no higher authorizing force than citizens themselves” (4). However, we
have pushed on through his analysis to demonstrate that, if “the promise of revolution as
the most noble civic ambition” is to be fully realized” (5), it will be necessary to take the
exercise of constituent power as a continuing obligation of the strong democrat. In this
sense, the role of the democratic constitutional theorist, as well as that of the
revolutionary constitution-maker, should be to provide novel ways of exercising the
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“right to revolution.” 51 This will entail the continuing responsibility to devise
institutional mechanisms that would allow constituent power to manifest and assert itself
from time to time. Of course, the exercise of constituent power would normally be
initiated in the streets, in the form of informal gatherings (as those now taking place in
Greece and Spain), civil disobedience, and other types of protests. However, a truly
democratic constitutional order would not only allow those types of popular
manifestations to occur without state interference, it would also establish more formal
and less complex processes which citizens could trigger and through which they could
deliberate and decide on important constitutional transformations. In other words, a
constitutional mode of democratic governance would promote rather than combat the
occurrence of constitutional revolutions. The constitutional journey of democracy never
ends, but occasionally pauses for breath.
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